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Bills and Notes-Recovery by Payee Against Drawee Bank on
Checks Paid Over Forged Endorsement
In the recent case of Modern Homes Constr. Co. v. Tryon Bank
& Trust Co.,1 the North Carolina Supreme Court wiped away an
old and inconsistent holding in the area of bills and notes' and laid
the legal cornerstone for related future litigation. The case involved
the drawer of a check who had contracted with the plaintiff-payee
to have a shell home built. Upon completion of the home the draw-
er, along with the plaintiff's agent, who was not authorized to en-
dorse his principal's checks, went to the drawee bank. There the
drawer made out a check to the plaintiff corporation for the amount
due and gave it to the agent who endorsed it, "Modern Homes
Construction Company by Ray Durham."'3  When the assistant
cashier objected to cashing the check, the drawer told him, "This
man is Modern Homes Construction Company, and you cash it for
me,"4 which the bank did. The agent absconded and the payee
brought suit against the drawee bank. The bank moved for and
received a nonsuit at the close of plaintiff's evidence. The plaintiff
appealed. The court reversed and indicated that if the plaintiff were
to recover on retrial it would have to be on the theory of conversion
rather than on either acceptance or negligence as averred in their
complaint.
Prior to the present case, North Carolina had allowed recovery
by a payee in similar circumstances on the theory of acceptance. 5
This theory had survived even though the Negotiable Instruments
Law (NIL) was adopted in 18996 and specifically required that
1266 N.C. 648, 147 S.E.2d 37 (1966).
* The legal issue in the case is presently covered by Negotiable Instru-
ment Law enacted in North Carolina as N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-1 to -199
(1953). Effective midnight, June 30, 1967, the Uniform Commercial Code,
enacted as N.C. GEN. STAT. 25-1-101 to -10-107 (1965), will govern the
law of bills and notes. Where applicable the Code will be cited in addition
to current statutes.
S266 N.C. at 650, 147 S.E.2d at 39.
'Ibid.
'Dawson v. National Bank, 197 N.C. 499, 150 S.E. 38 (1929); Dawson
v. National Bank, 196 N.C. 134, 144 S.E. 833 (1929).' See note 2 supra.
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an acceptance be in writing.7 The acceptance cases had erroneously
been based upon North Carolina General Statutes section 25-1448
(NIL section 137), which deems a drawee to have accepted a bill
if the drawee destroys it or refuses within twenty-four hours to
return it. But this section is concerned with bills that are "delivered
for acceptance" and not with those, as is the situation at bar, that
are presented for payment. As noted the inappropriate application
of the above section ignores the requirement of North Carolina
General Statutes section 25-1399 (NIL section 132) that an "accep-
tance ...be in writing and signed by the drawee." The rejection
of the unsound and widely criticized 0 acceptance theory places
North Carolina with the majority of jurisdictions, which treat the
drawee's actions as a conversion." The result is the same but the
theory is different.
In applying the theory of conversion it is important to under-
stand that the check made out to the holder-payee is not merely
evidence of a promise to pay, but that it is property2 and carries
incidents of ownership by the payee. The value of the property is
prima facie the face value of the check."3 Thus, when a bank takes
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-139 (1953)."'Where a drawee to whom a bill is delivered for acceptance destroys
the same or refuses within twenty-four hours after such delivery, or within
such other period as the holder may allow, to return the bill accepted or
nonaccepted to the holder, he will be deemed to have accepted the same."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-144 (1953).
0 "The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of his assent
to the order of the drawer. The acceptance must be in writing and signed
by the drawee. It must not express that the drawee will perform his promise
by any other means than the payment of money." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-139
(1953).
"0 See 25 ILL. L. Rav. 343 (1930) ; 7 N.C.L. Rav. 191 (1929) ; 38 YALE
L.J. 1143 (1929).
"' See Annot., 137 A.L.R. 874 (1942) ; Annot., 69 A.L.R. 1076 (1930);
9 C.J.S. Banks & Banking § 343 nn.87 & 88 (1938); BRANNAN, NEGOTI-
ABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 189 (7th ed. 1948); BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES
§ 146 (2d ed. 1961); 4 ARK. L. REv. 219, 220 (1950).
" Louisville & N.R.R. v. Citizens' & Peoples' Nat'l Bank, 74 Fla. 385,
77 So. 104 (1917). For an example of the result when a court fails to recog-
nize the property aspect of the check itself, see, Gordon Fireworks Co. v.
Capital Natl Bank, 236 Mich. 271, 210 N.W. 263 (1926), where the con-
version theory was rejected because "the bank did not convert funds of
plaintiff." (Emphasis added.)
"Modern Homes Constr. Co. v. Tryon Bank & Trust Co., 266 N.C.
at 653, 147 S.E.2d at 41; State v. First Nat'l Bank, 38 N.M. 225, 3 P.2d
728 (1934); BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 60 (7th ed. 1948).
The applicable Uniform Commercial Code provision is N.C. GEN. STAT. §
25-3-419(2) (1965).
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a check from an unauthorized person and makes payment to that
person, even in the normal course of business and unwittingly, the
bank is exercising unauthorized control over the payee's property
and withholding it from its rightful owner. A tort arises in favor
of the payee against the converting drawee.
Although Modern Homes Constr. Co. v. Tryon Bank & Trust
Co. was remanded and must be retried, 4 the court's particularly
thorough opinion establishes a firm base upon which business, banks,
attorneys, and lower courts can rely in future transactions.' 5
It is also important to note that the holding is consistent with
the newly adopted Uniform Commercial Code which becomes effec-
tive midnight, June 30, 1967.16 Under the Code, payment over a
forged endorsement is specifically covered and is treated as a con-
version.' The theoretical change from acceptance to conversion is,
therefore, also a fortunate step that will enable a smoother transi-
tion to the Uniform Commercial Code as well as offer sounder law
until it is effective. PHILIP G. CARSON
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Delay Between Offense and Arrest
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment,' but this right becomes operative only upon indictment.2 In
", There are questions of fact and collateral issues which could result in
a verdict for either the plaintiff or defendant in the particular case of
Modern Homes Constr. Co. v. Tryon Bank & Trust Co. I.e., the drawer is
deceased and his estate closed. There was a considerable time lapse between
payment by the drawee bank to the absconded agent and the commencement
of the payee corporation's action.
1 Regardless of the outcome in a particular case, the court is perfectly
clear and definite in its adoption of the conversion theory.
1" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-1-101 to -10-107 (1965). The Uniform Com-
mercial Code is treated in The Uniform Commercial Code in North Caro-
lina-A Symposium, 44 N.C.L. Rnv. 525 (1966). See also 2 N.Y. LAW
REVISION COMM'N, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1079 (1955);
Scope, Purposes and Functions of the Code, 16 ARK. L. Rnv. 1 (1961-62);
Comment, Allocation of Losses from Check Forgeries Under the Law of
Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 YALE L.J.
417, 471 (1953).
""N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-419 (1965). Faris, Commercial Paper, 44
N.C.L. Rzv. 598, 621 (1966), notes that the Uniform Commercial Code
"will" force a change from North Carolina's acceptance theory to the con-
version theory. The article was being printed when the court initiated the
change before the Code forced it.
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy ... trial. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
' "[I]f there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the
1966] DELAY OF ARREST 1075
